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An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance  
 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
This paper examines the extent and nature of corporate tax noncompliance using 
previously undisclosed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) operational audits and appeals data 
merged with confidential tax return data. The extent of tax noncompliance is primarily measured 
as the level of proposed tax deficiencies under IRS audit, although we also investigate the 
amount of the proposed deficiencies that are upheld after taxpayer appeals. We examine the 
relation between corporate noncompliance and various corporate characteristics such as firm 
size, industry, multinationality, being publicly traded, the form of executive compensation 
arrangements and governance characteristics. In addition, we examine the relationship between 
corporate tax noncompliance and average or effective tax rates calculated based on publicly 
available data.    
Our results are consistent with larger firms, firms in the large case audit program, and 
privately held firms having larger proposed audit deficiencies relative to the “true” tax liability. 
In general, we find that firms that are foreign controlled have a smaller deficiency than their 
purely domestic counterparts and that multinational firms have a greater deficiency relative to 
non-multinational firms. We find that both the percentage of annual compensation that is bonus 
and the level of equity incentives from exercisable stock options are positively related to the 
proposed deficiency, indicating that executive compensation may be associated with tax 
aggressiveness. Finally, we find no relation between a measure of governance quality and the 
proposed deficiency. We find little evidence that lower effective tax rates are related to 
deficiencies. 
Understanding the extent and nature of tax noncompliance is important because it has 
potentially serious implications for both the equity and efficiency of the tax system. Tax 
noncompliance can change the distribution of the tax burden from what was intended or from 
what a reading of the tax law might suggest. In the case of individual taxation, the distributional 
pattern of personal income tax noncompliance could on average be offset by Congress adopting 
an appropriate level of the nominal progressivity of the personal tax rate schedule that delivers 
the desired after-noncompliance degree of progressivity.  
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The equity implications of corporate tax noncompliance are not as straightforward.1  
According to the economic theory of taxation, the incidence of corporation taxes must be traced 
back to which people ultimately bear the burden of taxation--be they the company’s 
shareholders, managers, workers, or customers; from this perspective, it is not interesting or even 
meaningful to say corporations are worse off, or better off, as a result of a particular tax change.  
How the burden of the corporation income tax is distributed among these groups of individual 
people remains highly controversial. Note, though, that the theory of corporation income tax 
incidence addresses a tax policy that applies generally to all corporations. A particular act of 
noncompliance does not, by definition, apply to all corporations. Although a tax policy that 
facilitates noncompliance for all corporations might attract entry and thereby be shifted, for 
example, to customers through lower output prices, a successful act of noncompliance by one 
corporation will not be met by increased pressure from competitors. Thus, the windfall gains to 
those companies that successfully play the tax lottery by acting aggressively probably accrue to 
the shareholders in their role as residual claimants, shared to some extent with the corporate 
executives through incentivized compensation contracts.   
If there are particular characteristics of corporations in certain sectors that facilitate 
noncompliance or abusive avoidance, such as the presence of corporate intangibles, the apparent 
gains that accrue to shareholders of firms in these sectors via a lower effective tax rate will be 
partially eroded to the extent that competitors have similar characteristics that facilitate 
noncompliance; in this case the noncompliance-facilitating characteristic will benefit some other 
constituency, notably this sector’s customers. The same argument applies to the incidence of 
altering policy instruments related to deterrence, such as the penalties for detected 
noncompliance. The industrial organization of the tax shelter promoter business may also be a 
factor in determining how the tax savings are shared among the taxpayers and the tax shelter 
promoters. For example, if the promoter business is perfectly competitive with free entry, in the 
long run most of the gains from tax shelter “innovation” will accrue to the taxpayers; if not, some 
of the gain will accrue to the promoters via high fees.2   
Tax noncompliance has efficiency as well as equity implications, because opportunities 
for tax noncompliance can distort resource allocation in a variety of ways. It can cause inter-
                                                 
1 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Slemrod (2004). 
2 See Gergen (2002) and Hines (2004) for related discussions.   
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sectoral distortions because, for example, companies that otherwise would not find it attractive 
might have a financial subsidiary, or set up operations in a tax haven, to facilitate or camouflage 
abusive avoidance or noncompliance. In general, resources flow more than otherwise to activities 
that facilitate tax noncompliance.    
An important and fascinating question concerns the relationship between noncompliance 
and real corporate activity. Could cracking down on this behavior decrease corporate investment, 
because it eliminates what was essentially a do-it-yourself tax cut?  The answer depends on the 
relationship between the marginal cost (if there were no cost, no tax would be paid) to the 
taxpayer of avoiding and the volume of investment it undertakes.3 If there is no relationship, then 
cracking down on noncompliance and thereby increasing its cost will not decrease investment. 
More likely, the private cost of a given (absolute, not relative) level of avoidance is lower when 
the scale of real operations is higher, so that there is an implicit subsidy to investment. For 
example, if the IRS effectively overlooks noncompliance that constitutes a constant fraction of 
true income, then this is equivalent to a reduction in the effective marginal tax rate on income-
earning investment.4   
This discussion of the policy relevance of corporate tax noncompliance raises a number 
of research issues:   
• The relationship of noncompliance to size, because this sheds light on whether it 
is inframarginal or an implicit subsidy to investment. 
• The relationship of noncompliance to sector, because this sheds light on to what 
extent the benefit is bid away via competition. 
• The relationship of noncompliance to particular characteristics of companies, 
such as the presence of intangibles or multinationality, because this sheds light 
on whether the possibility of noncompliance affects the full cost of acquiring 
these characteristics. 
 
2.  Previous Literature 
Most existing analysis of tax noncompliance in the United States is based on the IRS Tax 
Compliance Measurement Program, or TCMP, that featured intensive examinations of random 
                                                 
3 This reasoning is developed in Slemrod (2001). 
4 The empirical relationship between corporate tax avoidance and the effectiveness of tax incentives to invest is 
examined in Slemrod, Dauchy, and Martinez (2005). 
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samples of tax returns. Although developed primarily to improve case-selection techniques, the 
data has been central to attempts to estimate an economy-wide measure of a corporate “tax gap”-
-the difference between taxes owed and taxes actually paid. The TCMP featured intensive 
examinations of a random sample of tax returns filed for tax years from the early 1960’s until 
1988, and the current corporate tax gap measures are primarily based on simple extrapolations 
from TCMP studies done in 1977, 1980 and 1983 and on routine operational audits from the 
mid-1980’s.5 The estimates for the corporation income tax gap came from three sources. For 
small corporations, the IRS used TCMP data adjusted for underreporting unlikely to be detected 
by the TCMP. For medium-sized corporations, the gap was calculated by estimating, based on 
operational audits, how much tax revenue would have been generated if the IRS examined all 
these corporations’ tax returns. Finally, for large corporations, because the IRS routinely 
examines a high percentage of these companies, examination results of the type analyzed in this 
paper were used as the basis of estimates of the tax gap.6  
The IRS has made corporate tax gap estimates for tax year 2001, but not later, based on a 
rough projection from the 15- to 20-year-old TCMP and other data, assuming that the 
compliance rates for each major component have not changed.7 Corporate underreporting in 
2001 is estimated at $29.9 billion, of which corporations with over $10 million in assets make up 
$25.0 billion.8 As a benchmark for comparison, estimated individual underreporting in 2001 is 
$148.8 billion. Compared to estimated 2001 tax year receipts paid voluntarily and in a timely 
fashion of $142.4 billion and $930.1 billion for corporate and individual income tax collections, 
respectively, the estimated underreporting rate in 2001 (calculated as underreported tax divided 
by receipts plus underreported tax) was 17.4 percent and 13.8 percent for corporations and 
individuals, respectively.    
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also calculates an annual measure of corporate 
“misreporting,” in order to adjust the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) measure of 
                                                 
5 The IRS has recently issued updated estimates of components of the tax gap based on the TCMP successor project 
known as the National Research Program (NRP).  However, the new estimates cover individual income tax and 
employment tax, and not the corporation income tax. 
6 This description is based on U.S. General Accounting Office (1988). 
7 The tax gap numbers are drawn from Internal Revenue Service (2004a).  A data gathering effort known as the 
National Research Program has collected similar data for tax year 2001, which have been used to produce updated 
but preliminary estimates of the tax gap; this project has not, though, yet updated the corporate tax gap estimates. 
8 Underreporting is only one of the three components of the total tax gap, which is estimated to be $282.5 billion.  
The other two components are nonfiling and underpayment.  There is no estimate for corporate nonfiling, and 
underpayment is a quite different issue. 
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corporate profits, which is based on data from corporate tax returns as filed.9 The BEA estimate 
for corporations reporting a profit is based on actual tax settlements--the change in income 
recommended by the IRS examination team reduced by the overall ratio of actual settlements to 
recommendations.10 For loss companies, the adjustment is calculated by multiplying total losses 
by an estimate of the percentage by which losses are reduced during audit. The BEA procedure 
calculates that in 2000 corporate tax misreporting as a percentage of misreporting plus total 
receipts less deductions (the tax-return-based measure that the BEA procedures begin from)11  
was 13.8 percent, compared to the 17.4 percent figure based on the IRS methodology that 
extrapolates from two-decades-old data assuming no change in compliance rates. The BEA 
series shows an increase in the misreporting rate since the mid-1990’s, but puts the 2000 
misreporting rate below the rates of the 1989 through 1992 period.   
There has been very little analysis of the micro data underlying the TCMP-based 
corporate tax gap studies. One exception is Rice (1992), who studied the 1980 TCMP data of 
small (with assets between $1 and $10 million) corporations. This analysis found that 
compliance is positively related to being publicly traded and in a highly regulated industry, so 
that characteristics that assure public disclosure of information also tend to encourage better tax 
compliance.12 Second, more profitable corporations are relatively less compliant. Finally, he 
finds that firm size and tax compliance are not positively related but instead that the reporting 
gap grows with the amount of a firm’s value added (total revenue).  
                                                 
9 The BEA methodology is discussed in Petrick (2002, p. 7). The official BEA term is misreporting, although their 
description of their methodology uses the terms “misreport” and “evade” interchangeably. 
10 In contrast, the IRS tax gap measures are based on the recommendations of the return audit, unadjusted for how 
much tax was ultimately assessed after any appeals process. This is defended in part as an approximate adjustment 
for the fact that IRS examiners do not detect all underreporting. Another methodological difference is that the BEA 
projects the average amount of recommended adjustment per return to all returns by multiplying this figure by the 
total number of returns, thus implicitly assuming that the examined returns are representative of all corporate 
returns.  In contrast, the IRS tax gap methodology for mid-sized corporations (with assets between $10 and $100 
million) projects the results of audited returns to the whole population with some acknowledgment that returns 
audited are not representative of the entire population, and indeed have higher unreported income than unexamined 
returns.  The first methodological difference would make the BEA estimates of underreporting lower than the IRS 
tax gap measure, while the second methodological difference would make it higher. We are grateful to Alan Plumley 
and Eric Toder of the IRS for insights about these issues.  
11 Note that the NIPA table refers to misreported income, not understated tax liability as in the IRS corporate tax gap 
studies. 
12 Tannenwald (1993) argued that Rice’s finding that publicly traded companies have higher compliance may have 
nothing to do with public disclosure, and instead might reflect the fact that publicly traded companies are more 
likely to have managers who are independent of its owners, and therefore are less fearful of commingling the 
owners’ personal affairs with those of the corporation.  
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In a study of large-case audit firms (the Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC), formerly 
Coordinated Examination Program) in the manufacturing industry from 1982-1992, Mills (1998) 
studies the relation between tax deficiencies and book-tax differences. Using corporate tax return 
Schedule M-1 data, she finds that the excess of book income over taxable income is positively 
related to proposed audit adjustments. Cloyd (1995) finds that tax preparers believe that when 
book-tax differences are greater, audit probabilities increase and the probability of a successful 
defense against the IRS decreases.  
A related literature investigates the level, variation, and determinants of effective tax 
rates (ETRs). To the extent that low effective tax rates, defined as total (or current) income tax 
expense divided by pre-tax earnings (from public financial statements), are a proxy for tax 
noncompliance or aggressive tax positions, variables that explain differences in ETRs may help 
explain tax deficiencies. The organization Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) has published several 
studies using effective tax rates to classify firms as tax aggressive. Their initial study was one of 
the factors causing additional inquiry into firms’ tax practices that eventually led to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.13  In addition, in a study of the benefits of investments in tax planning, 
Mills, Erickson and Maydew (1998) find, using data from Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996), that 
corporate expenditures on tax planning are negatively associated with the worldwide current 
effective tax rate. They also find that corporate ETRs are decreasing in size and leverage 
(because their ETR denominator is pretax income before interest expense), but higher for firms 
with foreign assets.   
 
3.  Data  
3.1.  Details 
This paper is the first to use operational data from the Voluntary Compliance Baseline 
Measurement (VCBLM) program compiled by the Large and Mid-Sized Business (LMSB) 
Research Division of the IRS to systematically examine the magnitude and nature of corporate 
tax noncompliance.14   The LMSB division contains CIC (Coordinated Industry Cases) and IC 
(Industry Cases) returns. Although LMSB handles all returns for taxpayers with assets exceeding 
                                                 
13  We note, however, that the CTJ makes several adjustments to the firms’ reported ETRs and its calculations are 
not undisputed by the firms on which it reports. 
14 Mills (1998) and Mills and Sansing (2000) use these data to investigate the relation between book-tax differences 
and audit adjustments.  Mills and Newberry (2001) explain the determinants of book-tax differences. Gleason and 
Mills (2002) use proposed deficiencies to evaluate financial statement disclosures of contingent tax liabilities.  
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$10 million dollars, about 1,200 taxpayers per year (in the 1990’s) are placed in the CIC group 
due to their large size and complexity. The CIC is often referred to as the “large case audit 
program,” and nearly all of these cases are audited. The IC returns are audited with less 
regularity, especially as the size of the firm decreases, although IC returns are audited more 
frequently than small business (less than $10 million of assets) and Schedule C businesses. 
The VCBLM audit data include Audit Information Management System (AIMS) closed 
examinations from 1990 through 2003.15 These data include extensive information about the 
audit and any subsequent appeal, including the tax deficiency (if any) proposed by the 
examination team, the amount the taxpayer agrees to at examination, and the results of the 
appeals or in the IRS counsel process (court decisions or out-of-court settlements). Henceforth, 
we refer to the entire appeals and counsel process as simply “appeals.” The dataset records tax 
paid on the return as originally filed, ignoring amended returns and carryback claims.16 
The initial dataset includes 114,257 firm-year observations, consisting of 37,995 unique 
employer identification numbers (EINs).17  It covers tax return periods from 1960 to 2002 
(although most return years are between 1986 to1999) for examinations closed between 1990 
and 2003 (although most closures occurred between 1993 and 2001). Both public and private 
companies are covered. 
We merge the VCBLM data with two separate sources of data.  First, we match the 
VCBLM data with corporate tax return data recorded by the Statistics of Income (SOI) division 
of the IRS and extracted by the Large and Mid-Size Business-Research Division at the IRS. 
Merging the VCBLM audit data (114,257) with the SOI tax return data (545,021) by tax return 
period and employer identification number yields 45,121 merged observations. Because the SOI 
tax return data for non-CIC firms are not available to us until 1994, we are unable to make full 
use of approximately 60,000 observations for VCBLM data for tax return years before 1994. 
                                                 
15 Readers of this and other studies must remain alert to the use of the word “closed.” The AIMS data (which are 
also used in GAO (1995, p. 19)) are organized by year in which examinations are closed. Audit data do not enter the 
system until the examination team has released the return with the deficiency agreed in full, unagreed (in full or 
part), or released with other information (such as a change that does not generate a deficiency), or a no change audit. 
In the VCBLM data, however, the return is assigned a status of closed only if it has been settled through appeals, 
counsel and all claims that relate to the return-year. We refer to this as a closed “case.” 
16 The VCBLM data do not contain information concerning the types of issues identified during the audit, although 
the IRS is developing an Issue Based Management Information System (IBMIS) that will track issue types for all 
exams.  
17 Note that taxpayers can change EIN over the sample period, so we cannot say that there are only 37,995 
companies.  
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Because the data are scarce in early years and include only relatively less complicated returns in 
the later years (an issue we discuss further below), we consider only the data for tax years from 
1983 through 1998.  Additional data requirements detailed in Appendix A reduce the sample to 
29,141, which is the basis of our primary regressions.  
We also merge this combined data with Standard and Poor’s Compustat financial 
statement data, using the employer identification number recorded in Compustat as of the 2003 
tape year. We are likely unable to match some observations because employer identification 
numbers (EINs) can change over time due to mergers and acquisitions and thus a public 
company in the VCBLM data may not match into Compustat because the Compustat data will 
have the new EIN of the merged company. Thus, some of the observations designated as private 
could actually be public, especially in the earlier return-years. Of the 29,141 observations in the 
sample, 12,100 (42 percent) of the return-years are designated as public.  
3.2. Discussion 
We will argue below that these operational data shed light on corporate tax 
noncompliance. This claim must be accompanied by several caveats. First, the deficiencies 
proposed by the examination team are not a perfect measure of actual noncompliance. Due to the 
many complexities of the tax law, exactly what is actual tax liability – and therefore what is 
actual tax noncompliance – is often not clear. Second, any given examination is not perfect.  
Some noncompliance may be missed, and there will also be mistakes in characterizing as 
noncompliance what is legitimate tax planning. For this reason, the data reflect not only the 
reporting behavior of the companies but also the enforcement behavior of the tax authority.  
Knowing that the resolution of the ultimate tax liability is often a long process of negotiation that 
may or may not involve the judicial system, the tax liability per the originally filed return, as 
well as the initial deficiency assessed by the examination team, may be partly a tactical “opening 
bid” that is neither party’s best estimate of the “true” tax liability.  Partly in response to this issue 
we also examine the amount of proposed adjustments that is sustained after the taxpayer exhausts 
any appeals. Whether the final settlement is a more accurate measure of noncompliance is an 
open question.   
Another issue is that the proposed deficiency as reported in the VCBLM data does not 
necessarily capture the long-term effect of tax noncompliance on revenues collected. There are 
two situations that have opposite effects with respect to timing. First, some of the proposed tax 
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deficiency may involve temporary adjustments. As an example, consider a corporation that 
expensed an item, but the examination team decided that this item should have been amortized 
instead. The tax effect of a difference between the expense and the first-year allowable 
amortization would be recorded in the VCBLM as a deficiency; however, the repercussion in 
future years – that taxable income would be lower than otherwise – is not accounted for 
anywhere. The result is that the present value of the tax effects of this adjustment is likely to be 
substantially less than the first-year adjustment recorded in the VCBLM data. Unfortunately, we 
cannot tell what fraction of adjustments relates to temporary differences. 
A related issue applies to adjustments made to the taxable income of corporations whose 
taxable income in the examination year is negative and that could not carry back these losses 
against earlier years’ positive taxable income. In this case an upward adjustment of taxable 
income (from a negative number to a smaller – in absolute value -- number) would not increase 
that year’s tax liability. The adjustment would, though, in general increase the present value of 
tax liability to the extent that it reduces the expected amount of further carryforward of losses.  
The VCBLM data record an estimate of the tax effect of adjustments as “revenue protection” 
with no discounting, but only for companies in the CIC program.  Valuing the revenue protection 
amounts the same as other adjustments presumes that the expected present value of a dollar of 
reduced carryforward is exactly a dollar. In fact, that fraction will vary depending on the 
expected pattern of future taxable income amounts. Compared to the treatment of temporary 
adjustments, treating revenue protection amounts as worth a full dollar in present value terms 
represents the opposite extreme of methodologies.  Largely because of the limited data 
availability, in what follows we have not included revenue protection amounts in our calculations 
of proposed deficiency. 
There is one other important qualification to keep in mind in interpreting the results we 
present below.  We examine the outcomes of tax filings for tax years between 1983 and 1998 
that were included in an IRS extract of audit data for AIMS closed cases from 1990 to 2003.  
Over this time period the coverage of the data changes, most notably but not only because we 
only have tax return data that include non-CIC companies beginning in return-year 1994.  
Because it can be several years before the audit and especially the appeals process is completed, 
for some of the tax returns the appeals process has not been completed: the “case” has not been 
closed.  For these returns we can measure the deficiency as per the audit, but not how much of 
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the disputed tax liability was upheld by the appeal process.  The likelihood that a tax return case 
is still “open” is higher the later is the tax return year and, holding the tax return year constant, 
the more substantive and complex are the tax issues that are disputed for the open cases.  For this 
reason presenting a time series of our noncompliance measures would probably not reveal 
anything about true trends in corporate reporting behavior (or tax enforcement vigilance), and we 
have refrained from reporting such a time series; we do, though, include a year dummy in the 
regression analysis to control for possible time trends, either real or due to sample selection. This 
caveat also applies to the time-aggregated figures that we do report.  The returns that are closed 
are by no means a random sample of all returns—they are more likely to pertain to earlier tax 
years and to less complicated and less disputed tax returns.  When this issue is especially 
pertinent below, we note its implications for how to interpret the results.  
We make two adjustments to the data as compiled by IRS in constructing the VCBLM 
data. First, the dataset records $1 in the deficiency field to represent the presence of a change 
(such as shrinking a tax loss) that did not actually increase tax due. We re-code the deficiency to 
zero, removing this tag. Second, where taxpayer agreed amounts (in exam, appeals or counsel) 
exceeded the deficiency, we constrained the settlement to the deficiency, essentially capping the 
settlement percentage on a firm-year basis at 100 percent. 
  
4.  Patterns of Proposed Deficiency, Agreements, and Appeal Results 
4.1. Aggregate  
Table 1 presents some summary statistics based on the VCBLM data. We present 
statistics for the full sample (29,141 observations) and for a sub-sample of observations for 
which the tax after proposed deficiency (i.e., reported tax plus the proposed deficiency, or 
proposed tax) is positive (25,266 observations). In the full sample, 55 percent of the observations 
have a proposed deficiency and in aggregate the deficiency is 0.17 percent of aggregate assets 
and 0.22 percent of total sales.18  For the sub-sample of observations for which the tax after 
proposed deficiency is positive, the aggregate proposed deficiency is 13.6 percent of the tax 
reported plus deficiency (henceforth the “proposed deficiency rate”).  Thus, the aggregate 
                                                 
18 In calculating this and all subsequent aggregate ratios, we report the ratio of the sum of the numerators to the sum 
of the denominators, and not the mean of the ratios. The deficiency-to-assets ratio is higher than found by Mills 
(1998) or Mills and Sansing (2000). When we constrain our sample to approximate the same years and other data 
constraints (e.g. manufacturing, book-tax differences), we obtain qualitatively similar results. 
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deficiency rate we measure is similar, but slightly below the lower of the 13.8 and 17.4 percent 
figures discussed earlier, that have been calculated by the BEA and IRS, respectively. Of the 
total proposed deficiency, just under one-third, or 32.0 percent, was agreed to by the taxpayer at 
the examination. 
We separately analyze the 22,552 firm-years for which the return-year has closed in our 
data, meaning that all appeals and court disputes are settled, and the 2,714 firm-years for which 
the return was still open. We find that the amount of the proposed deficiency agreed to by the 
taxpayer at the time of the exam varies sharply between open and closed cases—48.7 percent for 
the closed cases, but only 19.3 percent for the open cases. This difference is not surprising, and 
reflects the fact that it is precisely when the discrepancy between the proposed deficiency and the 
tax liability agreed to by the taxpayer is large that the case is likely to be subject to a protracted 
appeals process.  For the closed cases only, we can measure the ultimate resolution of the 
unagreed deficiencies.  The data indicate that another 11.3 percent of the proposed deficiency, or 
22.0 percent of the unagreed amount (.113/(1-.487)), was sustained. .  All in all, 60.0 percent of 
the proposed deficiency was either agreed to by the taxpayer or upheld at a later stage.  This 60 
percent sustention rate is almost certainly an upper bound estimate of the rate for all companies, 
because it excludes the tax return years that had not been closed when the data set was compiled.  
Because taxpayers are more likely to agree to smaller and less controversial proposed 
deficiencies and will fight longer and harder against larger and more controversial proposed 
deficiencies, the overall average including the still-open returns will likely be lower than 60 
percent.  
Consistent with taxpayers fighting larger deficiencies more, Table 1 shows that on 
average the open returns in our sample have a proposed deficiency/proposed tax of 20.7 percent 
compared to the closed returns which have an analogous rate of only 9.4 percent.  In untabulated 
computations of the aggregate proposed deficiency for our sample firms, a disproportionate 
amount of the deficiency is related to open returns. Although the open returns represent only 
10.7 percent of the number of return-years in the sample, 57 percent of the proposed deficiency 
is related to the open returns. 
 
4.2.  Firm Size  
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Table 2 presents the audit data by size of the firm. We divide the sample into seven 
groups by the amount of year-end assets reported on the tax return. The largest companies (those 
with assets greater than $5 billion) have the greatest percentage of firms with a deficiency (74 
percent) and for those with a positive proposed tax (reported tax plus deficiency), the highest 
proposed deficiency rate (14.6 percent, versus a range of 9.9 percent to 13.4 percent for the other 
six groups). The same pattern appears when the proposed deficiency is scaled by sales.  
(Although the reverse pattern appears when the scaling factor is assets, this pattern is probably 
spurious and caused by the fact that the returns in this table are categorized by the denominator 
of the deficiency rate (i.e., assets); to the extent that asset size mismeasures the ideal scaling 
factor, this will induce a negative association between assets and the deficiency-assets ratio.) 
Panel B shows that the largest firms were also much less likely to have had their returns 
closed over our observation period: 36.2 percent (820/2,266) were open, compared to only 8.2 
percent (1,894/23,000) for all other companies. As already noted, because a return is not closed 
until it is through both audit and appeals, it is not surprising that the returns of large and complex 
taxpayers remain open longer. 
Although the largest companies were much more likely to have open returns, the 
proposed deficiency rate in those open cases was much less than for smaller companies, just 18.8 
percent compared to rates ranging from 25.1 percent to 46.5 percent for the other asset size 
classes. This pattern is consistent with the existence of a fixed cost of fighting a proposed 
deficiency, so that small firms will contest only proposed deficiencies that are relatively large 
relative to the size of their operations. Among closed returns, the proposed deficiency rate was 
slightly higher than average for the largest companies, and the fraction of these proposed 
deficiencies agreed to at exam shows no linear size-related pattern. 
In interpreting these data, one must keep in mind two potentially confounding factors—
that the probability of audit and the intensity of audit, conditional on audit, may be related to the 
size of the company. This issue applies more generally to any characteristic that is correlated 
with the probability or conditional intensity of an audit. If the IRS is good at choosing for audit 
those companies with a higher probability of being noncompliant, then our data on audited firms 
will overstate the noncompliance rate among all firms, audited or not. This issue does not, 
however, apply to the approximately 1,200 companies in the CIC program, who are mostly 
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audited at some level of intensity every year.  For this group, the sample averages are much 
closer to the population characteristics.  
For the (generally smaller) non-CIC companies, to the extent that the audit selection rules 
are effective at identifying those companies with higher tax deficiencies, the sample population 
of audited companies should have a higher proposed deficiency rate than a random sample of 
companies would have had, if subject to audit. Thus we might draw an incorrect inference as to 
the relationship between size and noncompliance.   
To investigate this issue further, in Panels C and D of Table 2 we repeat the cross-tabs for 
only the CIC companies. The data reveal that, similar to the full sample, the largest companies 
have the greatest percentage of firms with a deficiency (75 percent versus a range of 51 to 68 
percent for smaller size groupings), are much more likely to have had their returns remain open 
over our sample period (36.4 percent (777/2,136)) as compared to 13.1 percent (879/6,726) for 
all other companies). As before, the largest CIC taxpayers have a lower deficiency rate in the 
open years than the smaller companies (18.9 percent vs. a range of 25.6 to 77.0 percent).  
However, in contrast to the full sample results described above, the largest firms within the CIC 
group do not have the highest deficiency rate for all returns (closed and open). For firms with a 
positive proposed tax, the largest firms’ deficiency rate is 14.8 percent while the smaller firms’ 
rate ranges from 13.4 to (a notable outlier value of) 34.0 percent. Thus, the result that the largest 
firms in the full sample have the highest deficiency rate is apparently largely driven by the 
difference in the proposed deficiency rate between (large) CIC firms and (generally smaller) 
non-CIC firms.      
The second confounding factor is the possibility that the intensity of an examination—
and therefore the likelihood of uncovering a deficiency--depends on the reported tax situation of 
the company. It is not clear how, if at all, this biases the interpretation of the size-deficiency 
relationship. If there are economies of scale in examining big companies, then audit intensity of 
an audit might be larger for larger companies. On the other hand, like the independent auditors 
who certify financial statements, the Internal Revenue Service can only sample the transactions 
of a complex multinational taxpayer, so that the possibility of undetected noncompliance may 
increase. 
Panels E and F complete the picture by detailing results for non-CIC firms. Again, the 
largest asset grouping has the highest percentage of firms with positive deficiency, the highest 
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deficiency rate relative to other asset classes (10 percent versus a range of 6.2 percent to 9.8 
percent), a much higher proportion of open returns (33 percent vs. 6 percent for all other asset 
groups), and the lowest deficiency rate when considering only open returns (13 percent vs. a 
range of 20.5 percent to 45.7 percent for the other groups).  
 
4.3. Other Firm Characteristics  
Table 3 presents audit data across partitions of firm characteristics other than size. The 
first comparison is private versus public companies. Considering only firms with a positive 
proposed tax (reported tax plus proposed deficiency), the data reveal that private companies have 
higher proposed deficiency rates than public companies (17.1 percent versus 12.5 percent), even 
though private companies have a lower proportion of firms with tax deficiencies (62 percent 
versus 65 percent).19 The first result is consistent with Cloyd (1995) and Cloyd et al.’s (1996) 
survey results that privately-held firms are more tax aggressive because they are less constrained 
by financial reporting incentives (i.e., they have fewer capital market pressures and thus can 
sacrifice reporting high financial accounting earnings and take more aggressive tax positions.) 
Panel B shows that public companies are much more likely to have their returns still 
open, with the percentage of open returns in our sample being 15.1 (1,636/10,856) percent versus 
7.5 percent (1,078/14,410) for private companies. This is probably because the public companies 
are generally larger and have a greater ability to contest the IRS proposals.  
The next partition of Table 3 compares foreign-controlled companies (FCCs) and 
domestic companies. We classify a firm as foreign controlled if the firm declares that its 
ownership is 25 percent or more foreign.20 The data reveal that FCCs have a much greater 
aggregate deficiency ratio than domestic companies, even though a lower fraction of FCCs have 
a deficiency.  For the sub-sample of observations that includes only firms with a positive 
proposed tax (the 25,266 observations), the FCCs have more than double the proposed 
deficiency rate as domestic companies, 25.4 percent versus 12.5 percent.21 These results are 
consistent with Grubert et al. (1993) and Grubert (1998), which find that FCCs on average have 
lower rates of return (and thus lower tax liabilities) than U.S.-owned corporations. Although 
                                                 
19 The private firms also have a larger aggregate deficiency over assets measure (0.19% versus 0.15 % for public 
firms) and a slightly larger aggregate deficiency over sales measure (0.22% versus 0.21 percent).   
20 This comes from the answer to question 7 on Schedule K of Form 1120. 
21 The FCCs also have higher proposed deficiencies than domestic companies as a fraction of either sales or assets. 
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much of the lower relative rate of return can be explained by cross-sectional variables such as 
age, investment income, reliance on outside suppliers, dividends, and depreciation and interest 
expense differentials, Grubert (1998) suggests that between a quarter and a half of the difference 
cannot be explained by economic factors and may be due to more aggressive tax reporting (e.g., 
transfer pricing and income shifting). Mills and Newberry (2004) find that taxable income 
reported by FCCs is related to the incentives to shift in or out of the U.S. in response to the 
difference between the U.S. and the worldwide effective tax rate, consistent with FCCs 
responding to income shifting opportunities.  
The separate analysis of open and closed returns in Panel B reveals that much of the 
difference between the FCCs and domestic firms can be attributed to the large difference in the 
proposed deficiency rate for the returns that are still open. Among this group of companies, the 
proposed deficiency rate is 43.8 percent for FCCs compared to the deficiency rate for open 
domestic firms of 18.3 percent.    
The next partition of data compares multinational firms to domestic firms.  We classify a 
company as multinational if it claimed a foreign tax credit or filed a Form 5471 (indicating that it 
has a foreign subsidiary). Panel A of Table 3 reveals that for the sub-sample of firms with a 
positive proposed tax, a slightly higher percentage of multinational firms have a deficiency (64 
percent) compared to domestic firms (62 percent). For this same sample, the aggregate proposed 
deficiency rate is only slightly higher for multinational firms (13.7 percent) versus domestic 
firms (13.5 percent) and multinational firms appear to settle at higher agreement percentages 
(33.3 percent) than domestic firms (28.6 percent).  
We next partition the data between CIC firms and non-CIC firms. Consistent with the 
discussion above, the data reveal that for the sub-sample of firms with a positive tax, CIC firms 
have a higher proportion of firms with a deficiency (72 percent) relative to the non-CIC firms (58 
percent ), a higher deficiency rate (14.7 percent versus 8.1 percent ), are less likely to agree to the 
deficiency upon exam (CIC firms agree on average with 30.6 percent  of proposed deficiency 
whereas the non-CIC firms agree to 45.3 percent ). Finally, a much higher percentage of CIC 
returns are still open during our sample period (18.7 percent (1,656/8,862))  compared to the 
non-CIC firms (6.5 percent (1,058/16,404)). 22  
                                                 
22 Our finding that for non-CIC companies 45.3 percent of the proposed deficiency is agreed to by the taxpayer at 
the exam stands in apparent contrast to the findings of GAO (1995) that estimates in Table II.9 that for non-CIC 
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Table 3 also shows how the aggregate results differ by industry sector, for 8 single-digit 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. While strong patterns do not 
emerge from this analysis, it appears that in aggregate, firms in the manufacturing industry, the 
trade, transportation and warehousing industry, and the education, healthcare, and social 
assistance industry have a higher proposed deficiency rate and a lower proportion of deficiency 
agreed to upon exam relative to the other groups. As a result we include industry effects in the 
regression analysis below. 
 
5. The Determinants of Corporate Tax Noncompliance:  Regression Analyses 
5.1  Baseline Model and Variable Definitions 
The cross-tabs presented in Tables 2 and 3, while suggestive, cannot provide a sense of 
the relationship between the proposed deficiency measures and any given company 
characteristic, holding other characteristics constant. For example, on average public companies 
are bigger than private companies, so the public-private and size breakdowns may reveal a 
mixture of the association with size and being public. To sort out the partial relationships, we 
turn to a multivariate regression analysis.  
In so doing, we must address the potential problem that non-random sample selection 
may bias the regression results. One approach to this problem is to first estimate on the universe 
of companies the probability that a given company will be audited and then, from the probit 
equation, construct an inverse Mills’ ratio that is added to the equation that estimates 
noncompliance conditional on being audited. However, this method is unlikely to be convincing 
because it is difficult to identify independent variables that affect the probability of audit but do 
not affect the amount of noncompliance.   
                                                                                                                                                             
companies whose returns were examined between 1988 and 1994, 25 percent of the proposed deficiency is agreed to 
at exam.  (The GAO report also includes an estimated “assessment rate,” which apparently tracks the resolution of 
the appeals of unagreed amounts; however, because it does so only until 1994, it excludes many unresolved cases 
and thus suffers from a potentially severe sample selection bias, as we understand the compilation of the AIMS case 
data.)  One reason why our estimates differ from those of the GAO is that the GAO study uses data on returns for 
which the audits (not the cases) were completed between 1988 and 1994, while we examine data for non-CIC firms 
that begin with the 1994 tax year; because the two samples do not overlap, our estimates will differ from GAO’s to 
the extent that IRS or taxpayer behavior changed over this period.   Indeed, the same GAO report indicates that the 
fraction of returns for which the taxpayer agreed to the proposed deficiency increased continually from 39 percent in 
1988 to 51 percent in 1994; the percentage of the dollar amount agreed to by the taxpayer upon exam changed 
discontinuously over the period, but was highest in 1994, when it reached 34 percent compared to the period average 
of 25 percent.   
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Rather than pursue this approach, we instead perform all the regression analyses both on 
the whole sample and then separately only on the CIC sample. For reasons already discussed, a 
large percentage of the CIC companies are audited every year, so the sample selection issue is 
not likely to be quantitatively important for the CIC sub-sample.23 We estimate Tobit 
specifications, beginning with the same set of explanatory variables discussed in the previous 
section and some other variables that are discussed below.  
Our dependent variable is the proposed deficiency upon IRS audit scaled by one of two 
alternative measures of the size of the corporation, assets and sales.24 We estimate the following 
model: 
 
Deficiency/Scale = α0 +  a1 LogAssets (or LogSales) +  
α2CIC + α3Public + α4FCC + α5 Multinational + α6 - α12 Sector + ε 
where 
Deficiency  = the proposed tax deficiency, as recorded in the VCBLM database of 
the Internal Revenue Service, 
Scale   = total year-end assets or sales per the tax return,  
LogAssets (or LogSales)   = the natural logarithm of millions of dollars of total year-end assets or 
sales per the tax return,  
CIC   = one if the taxpayer is a member of the Coordinated Industry Cases or 
its precedessor, the Coordinated Examination Program; zero 
otherwise, 
Public = one if the taxpayer’s EIN matches to a company in the Compustat 
database for whom total assets is present; zero otherwise, 
FCC  = one if the IRS designates the company as a U.S. foreign controlled 
corporation based on answering yes to question 7 in Schedule K of 
                                                 
23 Although, note that Mills (1998) uses a Heckman two-stage test to control for sample selection bias even within 
the Coordinated Industry Cases, finding that size and profitability are the best predictors of full audits (versus 
surveyed returns). That is, tax returns with losses and smaller taxpayers are less frequently audited, even within the 
“large-case” audit population.     
24 We do not use the proposed deficiency rate (proposed deficiency/(tax reported + proposed deficiency)) as the 
dependent variable for two reasons.  First, this ratio can be undefined when the reported tax and proposed deficiency 
are both zero and it is not clear that we want to exclude these firms (i.e. we may overstate the rate of noncompliance 
if we leave them out of the analysis).   Second, when the reported tax is zero but there is a proposed deficiency of 
any magnitude the proposed deficiency rate becomes 100%, not distinguishing between firms that underreport $10 
of tax and those that underreport $1 million of tax. 
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Form 1120, indicating that 25 percent or more of ownership is by a 
foreign person; zero otherwise, 
Multinational   = one if the taxpayer claims a foreign tax credit or files a Form 5471, 
which must be filed by U.S. individuals, partnerships, corporations, 
and trusts with five percent or more stock ownership in a foreign 
corporation; zero otherwise, 
Sector  = one if the company is the relevant one-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes from two through 
eight, omitting zero and nine; zero otherwise.   
Year = one if the return is in a particular return-year; zero otherwise. 
 
Prior to estimating the regression model above, we winsorize the continuous variables at 
the 1 percent and 99 percent values of their distributions by setting values outside those ranges to 
the values at those percentiles. Table 4 provides summary statistics for the winsorized regression 
variables and other variables of interest.  
 In order to minimize the spurious negative bias to the estimated effect of scale that results 
from errors in measuring the true scale variable, we use sales as the size measure when the 
dependent variable is scaled by assets and assets as the size measure when the dependent 
variable is scaled by sales.  
 
 5.2  Baseline Regression Results 
Table 5 presents results for the baseline Tobit regressions, with and without the indicator 
variable for membership in the CIC, and for the CIC sub-sample only. The effect of size on the 
level of deficiency is positive and significant in the specifications that do not include the CIC 
variable separately, consistent with the CIC also proxying for size.  Thus, on average, larger 
firms are more noncompliant than smaller firms, consistent with the reasonable explanation that 
larger, more complex firms have more opportunities for tax noncompliance (that is detected by 
the IRS) and consistent with the tendency noted in Table 2. In addition, we note that size remains 
positive and significant (at least at p=0.10 for a two-tailed test) even when the model is estimated 
over only CIC firms, which suggests that size is more likely a determinant of noncompliance 
rather than just a determinant of being audited. The variable indicating that the firm is part of the 
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CIC program is positive and significant after controlling for size. Thus, firms in the CIC have a 
greater deficiency on average than firms of the same size not in the CIC. This may be due to 
greater noncompliance or a higher intensity of audit for these firms.  
As in the cross-tabulations of Table 3, public firms have smaller scaled deficiencies in the 
full sample. This result is consistent with Cloyd (1995), Cloyd et al. (1996) and Mills and 
Newberry’s (2001) findings that private firms are less constrained by financial reporting 
incentives in their choices to be tax-aggressive. However, within the CIC sub-sample, controlling 
for other factors, public ownership does not explain deficiency when deficiency/sales is the 
dependent variable.   
Within the full sample, after controlling for other factors, being a foreign-controlled 
corporation is negatively related to the tax deficiency. Note this is the opposite of the finding 
reported in Table 3 where it appears that in aggregate the FCCs have a greater deficiency rate (in 
terms of assets, sales, and proposed deficiency rate) than domestic firms. This suggests that the 
FCCs are notably different than domestic companies with respect to other characteristics that are 
associated with our measure of noncompliance. Indeed, in untabulated results, we find that FCCs 
are on average smaller, have a greater percentage of zero deficiencies, and have a greater 
percentage of zero tax paid on the return.  Again, within the CIC sub-sample, controlling for 
other factors, FCC does not explain deficiency when deficiency/sales is the dependent variable.   
The results for the multinationality variable are generally consistent with multinational 
firms having greater deficiencies. In the full sample, being a multinational firm is significantly 
positively associated with the level of deficiency.  In the CIC-only sub-sample, the estimated 
coefficient on multinationality is also positive and significant, indicating that within the firms of 
the CIC program the multinational firms have a greater deficiency rate.   
Although not presented in the interest of brevity, we note that in some specifications 
(specifically when deficiency/assets is the dependent variable) the industry effects are significant 
and that the year effect coefficients are generally significant as well.  In all cases the model Chi-
squared statistic is higher if the industry and year effects are included.25 
                                                 
25 Because Mills (1998) finds that loss firms are audited less frequently than firms with positive taxable income, we 
also estimate a model that includes the variable reported tax/scale to control for the revenue potential of the firm.  
We expect that the IRS is more likely to audit high tax firms more than low tax firms. In untabulated results we find 
that, consistent with our conjecture, this variable is highly positively significant in all specifications.  The other 
estimated coefficients are not greatly affected, although size becomes more significantly positive and 
multinationality becomes significantly negative in the model that does not include a CIC dummy variable. 
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5.3   Additional Variable Definitions: Intangibles, Executive Compensation, and 
Governance 
In this section, we add measures of intangible intensity, executive compensation and 
equity incentives, and governance quality as explanatory variables into the regression 
specification above to expand our understanding of the determinants of tax noncompliance as 
measured by proposed deficiency rates. These variables are only available for publicly traded 
firms with data available on Compustat and/or Execucomp. Those variables are defined as 
follows: 
 
Advertising/Scale  = advertising expense (Compustat data item #45) / Assets (#6) or Sales 
(#12),  
R&D Expense/Scale = research and development expense (Compustat data item #46) scaled 
by Assets (#6) or Sales (#12). If R&D expense is missing we reset the 
value to zero, 
Market-to-Book = market value of the firm at the end of the year (Price per share, 
Compustat data item #199 * Common shares outstanding, #25), 
divided by book value of equity (#60), 
Bonus Percentage  = proportion compensation that is bonus.  Calculated as the sum over 
the five most highly paid executives of the annual bonus in the year 
prior to the year for which the tax deficiency is assessed scaled by the 
sum of the bonus, salary, and the Black-Scholes value of the stock 
option grants for the five most highly paid executives in the year prior 
to the year for which the tax deficiency is assessed, 
Exercisable Option  
  Sensitivity = the sensitivity of the holdings of exercisable (vested) executive stock 
options to a 1 percent change in stock price. This is the sum for the 
five most highly paid executives of the firm and holdings are measured 
in the year prior to the year for which the deficiency is assessed (The 
computation of sensitivity is explained in more detail below.), 
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Vested Holdings  
  Sensitivity = the sensitivity of the holdings of exercisable executive stock options 
and unrestricted stock to a 1 percent change in stock price.  This is the 
sum for the five most highly paid executives of the firm and holdings 
are measured in the year prior to the year for which the deficiency is 
assessed (The computation of sensitivity is explained in more detail 
below.), 
Total Equity  
  Sensitivity = the sensitivity of the holdings of all stock options, all unrestricted 
stock, and all restricted stock to a 1 percent change in stock price.  
This is the sum over the five most highly paid executives of the firm 
and holdings are measured in the year prior to the year for which the 
deficiency is assessed (The computation of sensitivity is explained in 
more detail below.), 
Governance Index = measure of governance developed by Gompers et al (2003).  It is an 
index of shareholder rights that ranges from 1 to 24, a low value 
indicates high quality governance. Set to zero in regression when 
missing. 
Governance Index  
Missing = indicator set equal to one if Governance Index is missing, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The calculation of the sensitivity of executive equity holdings to a change in stock price 
warrants further explanation. The expected wealth change from stock is estimated by multiplying 
the market value of the stock holdings at year-end (the year prior to the alleged accounting fraud 
for the alleged fraud firms) by one percent. For stock options, we use the method of calculating 
their sensitivity to stock price as described by Core and Guay (2002). Although detail such as the 
number of options, exercise price, and time to maturity is available from Execucomp or the 
current year proxy statement for current year grants, much of these data are unavailable in the 
current year proxy statement for prior grants. The one-year approximation method described in 
Core and Guay (1999, 2002) requires information only from the most recent proxy statement to 
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estimate the sensitivity of the option portfolio to a change in stock price. The sensitivity to stock 
price for each option held is estimated as  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]01.0**)(01.0**)()( priceZNepricepriceeoptionvalu dT−=∂∂  
 
where d is the natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option, T is the 
time to maturity of the option in years, N is the cumulative normal probability function and Z is 
[ ] 212 /)2/()/ln( TdrTXS σσ+−+ , where S is the price of the underlying stock, X is the exercise 
price of the option, r is the natural logarithm of the risk-free interest rate, and σ  is the expected 
stock-return volatility over the life of the option.   
 
5.4 Results for Additional Variables 
In Table 6, we introduce proxies for the tax planning opportunities afforded by firms that 
develop intangible assets, proxies for executive compensation contracts and equity holding 
incentives, and proxies for the governance quality at the firm. We present results only for the 
specifications in which the deficiency/sales ratio is the dependent variable. (In untabulated 
regressions using deficiency/assets as the dependent variable, the results are qualitatively similar 
except where noted.) We first re-estimate the baseline regression over only those observations 
having the additional variables to confirm that the results from Table 5 hold for this sub-sample. 
This analysis is presented in the first column of Table 6. The results are qualitatively similar to 
Table 5. We also find that the results for our baseline variables are consistent with those reported 
in Table 5 when the new variables are included, indicating they are not omitted correlated 
variables for our main variables of interest. 
 
 5.4.a. Intangible Assets 
For intangible asset proxies we use three variables; 1) the ratio of research and 
development expense (R&D expense) to the scale measure (assets or sales) 2) the ratio of 
advertising expense to the scale measure and 3) the market-to-book ratio. We predict that firms 
with more intangible assets will have greater opportunities for tax planning, consistent with 
Grubert and Slemrod’s (1998) finding in the context of Puerto Rico subsidiaries of U.S. parents 
that the presence of intangible assets facilitates transfer pricing.  
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The coefficients on R&D expense and the market-to-book ratio are significantly positive, 
indicating that the greater the intangible assets of the firm, the greater the tax deficiency, 
consistent with these firms having greater tax planning opportunities.  However, the results for 
advertising expense are marginally negatively significant, which is inconsistent with this 
explanation.  One explanation is that firms with more advertising expense are more likely to be 
consumer products firms.  As a result, these firms may be more compliant in efforts to avoid 
negative publicity from being a “bad” corporate citizen. 
 
5.4.b. Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation contracts may be set to induce or prevent tax avoidance 
activities on the part of firm management. In discussing the incentives that affected Enron, the 
Joint Committee on Taxation noted that Enron’s tax department was viewed as a profit center by 
the firm. This observation is consistent with increasing pressure of firms to report a relatively 
low effective tax rate during the 1990s.26 Phillips (1999) provides evidence consistent with firms 
whose managers’ bonus payments are based on after-tax income reporting lower effective tax 
rates. In other work, Desai and Dharmapala (2005) investigate the relationship between incentive 
compensation and proxies for tax sheltering.  To examine the association between the form of 
executive compensation and tax noncompliance, we include measures of executive compensation 
in our regressions. 
For compensation we include four different proxies each in a separate regression; 1) 
bonus percentage, 2) exercisable option sensitivity, 3) vested holding sensitivity, and 4) total 
equity sensitivity, all defined above.27 Table 6 shows that only total vested holdings sensitivity is 
insignificant (p=0.101), with the other three variables being positively related to the amount of 
tax deficiency, providing preliminary evidence that executive compensation is positively related 
to tax noncompliance.28 
                                                 
26 For example, the Council for International Tax Education, Inc.  previously publicized seminars designed to help 
corporations plan for lowering effective tax rates. However, as of 2005, the programs on their web site 
(http://www.citeusa.org/programs/index.html) are more concerned with tax, financial reporting and Sarbanes-Oxley 
compliance. Their SFAS109 course still includes a bullet "Using Export Sales to Reduce the Effective Tax Rate." 
27 See Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2005) for a full discussion of how these variables relate to management 
incentives and may affect accounting aggressiveness. 
28 We recognize that the choice of compensation contract is endogenous in this regression.  We include some likely 
controls for why this type of compensation is given such as book-to-market and research and development which 
proxy for investment opportunity set.  We leave a more detailed analysis of compensation more formally dealing 
with the endogeneity issue for future research. 
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5.4.c. Governance Quality 
Finally, we investigate whether the governance characteristics of the firm affect the level 
of noncompliance. To do so we include the governance index compiled by Gompers et al. 
(2003). This index is a score ranging from 1 to 24 that combines data from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) on firms’ takeover defenses with information on 
antitakeover provisions in state statutes to calculate an index that reflects the extent to which the 
firm is protected from hostile takeovers. A lower value of the index indicates a better quality of 
governance (see Gompers et al. (2003) for more details). If better-governed firms take fewer 
aggressive positions, we expect that better-governed firms will have lower tax deficiencies. 
 Table 6 shows that governance is not associated with the tax deficiency, indicating that 
governance quality of the firm does not alter the level of tax aggressiveness. However, because 
our sample period is prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we cannot test whether this 
relation became more important after its passage.29   
 
6.  Correlations among Measures of Tax Aggressiveness 
The data examined in this paper are one indicator of a company’s tax aggressiveness.  
This indicator has the advantage of being based on extensive audits of a company’s tax filings 
(and any subsequent appeals of the examination results) but, for reasons we have already 
discussed, it is not perfect.  Because these data are confidential, past researchers have for the 
most part relied on other indicators of tax aggressiveness that can be constructed from publicly 
available data. The most common of such indicators include the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR), 
measured in a variety of ways  and the firm’s book-tax differences, perhaps adjusted for known 
differences in these concepts that are not indicative of tax aggressiveness (see Plesko 2003 and 
                                                 
29 Desai and Dharmapala (2005) develop a model, and provide supporting empirical evidence based on book-tax 
differences from financial statements as a measure of tax aggressiveness, in which increasing the extent of incentive 
compensation can decrease the level of tax sheltering for firms with relatively poor governance.  To investigate the 
interaction between governance and incentive compensation, we estimate a model including an indicator variable for 
well governed firms (those with a governance score of 7 or below, consistent with DD), by itself and interacted with 
the compensation variables in Table 6.  We find some evidence consistent with their premise in that well governed 
firms have a more positive association between vested option sensitivity and our measure of deficiency meaning 
well governed firms engage in more avoidance when their compensation incentives are high relative to poorly 
governed firms.  However, overall the results are mixed because in the other two equity incentive specifications the 
interaction term is insignificant and, in the bonus regression (not tested by DD), the interaction term is negative, 
meaning managers in well-governed firms avoid fewer taxes when the bonus is higher.   
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Desai and Dharmapala 2005 for examples). In this section we examine whether effective tax 
rates are associated with the audit-based measure studied in this paper. In other words, does the 
tax aggressiveness that results in high audit deficiencies result in a low effective tax rate for the 
firm?   
Effective tax rate measures based on financial statement information may not provide a 
good proxy for tax noncompliance. Depending on how it is defined, the numerator, total taxes, 
may reveal little about actual tax liability because it includes the effect of deferred taxes (i.e., 
future deductible and future taxable amounts). Moreover, even if one defines the numerator to 
include only current taxes payable, this will not in many cases approximate the actual tax 
liability of the firm.30 One important reason for this difference for our purposes is that when 
firms take an aggressive tax reporting position that they expect is probable (literally “more likely 
than not”) of being denied, they are required for financial accounting purposes to accrue the 
estimated loss in the current period even though the tax is not being paid currently.31 Thus, the 
aggressive position would not be fully reflected as a decrease in the firm’s effective tax rate.  As 
a result, it is an empirical question as to the association of tax deficiency and ETR.    
Further, one must be cautious about how to interpret any observed correlation between 
ETR and proposed deficiency. For example, it is possible that the level of reported ETR affects 
the intensity of the audit examination and therefore the amount of deficiency uncovered because 
a low ETR may be a signal to the IRS that the company has taken aggressive positions (even 
though the company is aware that a low ETR provides this signal, and the IRS is aware that the 
company is aware, etc.).32 Conversely, as discussed above, it may be that the IRS is more likely 
to intensively examine companies that already have a substantial positive tax liability. In the 
extreme, uncovering an income understatement by a company making losses and that has 
exhausted its loss carry back capacity is unlikely to generate much revenue in a present value 
                                                 
30 See Hanlon (2003) for a detailed explanation of why a firm’s financial statements cannot be used to infer tax 
liabilities or taxable income in many cases. One material example is the effect of stock options. 
31 See Financial Accounting Standard No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies. In addition, see the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s recent proposal (available at www.FASB.org) to issue an Interpretation of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, which would require a higher probability of success 
for a tax position for the firm not to accrue the tax related to the aggressive position. Gleason and Mills (2002) 
discuss how little taxpayers disclose to shareholders about large tax deficiencies, even when they appear to be 
material. 
32 Mills and Sansing (2000) adopt such a game-theoretic approach to analyzing the effect of book-tax differences on 
audit outcomes.  
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sense. More generally, the more profitable a firm is, the more likely is it to be true that 
uncovering a taxable income understatement will lead to a recovery of unpaid taxes.    
We calculate a firm’s effective tax rate using U.S. current tax expense divided by the 
firm’s U.S. pretax income (U.S. Current ETR). Because the audit data is U.S. only, we use the 
U.S. based measure rather than the world-wide measure.33 We delete observations for which the 
denominator of the ETR measure is negative, because the ratio becomes uninterpretable. In 
addition, to ensure that our results are not unduly influenced by outliers, we reset any values 
greater than 75 percent to 75 percent and any values less than zero to zero.   
We first present in Table 7 simple correlations between the deficiency/proposed tax, 
deficiency/assets or deficiency/sales ratios and the ETR measure. The correlation between the 
ETR and deficiency/proposed tax is negative, consistent with lower ETRs representing more tax 
aggressive behavior, although this correlation could be caused by a small-denominator problem. 
If a zero-ETR corporation pays no tax on the return as originally filed, but has one dollar (or any 
amount) of tax deficiency, the ratio of deficiency/proposed tax is its maximum value of 100 
percent. In contrast, we find that the correlations between the ETR measure and our tax 
deficiency/assets and tax deficiency/sales measures are positive. This is not consistent with the 
tax aggressiveness reflected in the deficiency measure causing the firm to have a low effective 
tax rate.   
To examine whether there is a relation between a firm’s ETR and its proposed deficiency 
rate, holding other influencing factors constant, we next estimate a regression of each ETR 
measure on the tax deficiency measure and other controls. We first estimate the regression over 
all firms, and then we delete observations with negative or zero taxable income (Form 1120, 
Line 28) in order to eliminate the effect of loss firms.  
The regression results, presented in Table 8, Column 1, reveal that the tax 
deficiency/sales variable is significantly positively related to the ETR measure when all return-
years are included. Thus, consistent with the univariate correlations, we find that the greater the 
tax deficiency (the more tax aggressive the firm) the higher the ETR, inconsistent with the ETR 
being an indicator of tax aggressiveness as measured by the proposed tax deficiency.  This result 
could occur if high ETR attracts a more intense audit if the IRS believes the revenue gains are 
                                                 
33 Although using a world-wide measure (untabulated) we find similar relationships between deficiency and the 
world-wide ETR as described above for the U.S. Current ETR. 
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greatest for these firms.  Another explanation is that tax-aggressive firms will record a tax 
cushion in order to provide an accounting reserve for its tax aggressive position. While this 
would not explain the positive relation, it does explain why a negative relation is not observed.    
In Table 8, Column 2, where the loss firms are eliminated, the relation of the deficiency 
rate to the U.S. Current ETR is insignificant, again providing no evidence consistent with 
financial statement ETRs reflecting the same noncompliance as shown in the deficiency rates 
from our data.   
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper offers some exploratory analysis of an extraordinarily rich data set of audit 
and appeals records, matched with tax returns and financial statements, of several thousand 
corporations. As with any exploratory analysis, it has raised at least as many questions as it has 
provided definitive answers. But it has provided preliminary answers to several important 
questions.   
First, it has confirmed that corporate tax noncompliance, at least as measured by 
deficiencies proposed upon examination, amounts to approximately 13 percent of “true” tax 
liability. That estimate is in line with official IRS tax gap measures, which in one way is not 
surprising because the tax gap measures were largely based on audit data, but provides new 
information because the official IRS measures are in part based on nearly two-decade old data.   
Second, noncompliance is generally a progressive phenomenon, meaning that 
noncompliance as a fraction of a scale measure increases with the size of the company. 
Combined with other information that the noncompliance rate among very small businesses is 
significantly higher than 13 percent, this suggests that business tax noncompliance relative to 
scale is U-shaped, with medium-sized businesses having the lowest rate of noncompliance. This 
pattern is not consistent with noncompliance being an inframarginal benefit to doing business, 
and implies that the opportunity for noncompliance provides some implicit subsidy to achieving 
greater scale through investment. 
Third, noncompliance is related to some observable characteristics of companies, 
including sector and two measures of the presence of intangible assets. This suggests that the 
private benefits of successful tax noncompliance by any given firm are to some extent competed 
away because similar firms find tax noncompliance to be similarly available. Being a private 
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company is also associated with higher noncompliance, corroborating the common suspicion that 
private companies are less affected by the financial reporting incentives to publicly report high 
earnings, which in turn constrains the ability to report low earnings to the IRS.   
Fourth, we find some evidence that incentivized executive compensation schemes are 
associated with more tax noncompliance. We find no relation between a commonly-studied 
measure of the quality of corporate governance and the extent of proposed (scaled) tax 
deficiency. 
Finally, we find that there is no consistent simple or partial negative association between 
our measure of tax noncompliance and measures of the effective tax rate calculated from 
financial statements. This might mean that the financial statements are uninformative about tax 
aggressiveness in part because of the tax cushion for future adverse judgments that is included in 
the tax expense amount on the financial statements. In addition, it may be that publicly available 
effective tax rate measures affect the aggressiveness with which the IRS pursues tax 
noncompliance.  
There are many reasons why we offer these conclusions with such tentativeness; we close 
by mentioning two. One is that our central measure of tax noncompliance is in fact the result of 
an imperfect and perhaps systematically intense audit of a tax return declaration that may itself 
be the opening bid in what is expected, often correctly, to be an intense negotiation and formal 
appeals process. Second, the causal links among tax aggressiveness, executive compensation, 
and corporate governance are potentially complex, and the analysis presented here at best 
establishes statistical associations, but certainly does not establish causal relations. Answering 
these, and other, questions, in future research should help to clarify the magnitude and nature of 
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TABLE 1- Sample Statistics 
 
 
 All Returns Closed Returns Open Returns 
    
Total Observations 29,141   
% with Deficiency > 0 55%   
Deficiency / Assets 0.0017   
Deficiency / Sales 0.0022   
Observations with Proposed Tax > 0 25,266 22,552 2,714 
% with Deficiency > 0 63%   
Deficiency / Proposed Tax 0.136 0.094 0.207 
Agreed to at Exam / Deficiency 0.320 0.487 0.193 
Agreed to at Appeals/ Deficiency  0.113 NA 
Agreed/ Final Tax  0.059 NA 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
The data come from the Voluntary Compliance Baseline Measurement Program (VCBLM) for return-years between 1983 and 1998 as shown in 
Appendix A, based on an IRS (Large and MidSize Business Research division) extract in 2004 of AIMS closed-case data from 1990-2003. Deficiency is 
the proposed tax deficiency. Proposed Tax (Prop. Tax) is the sum of Tax On Return plus Deficiency. Tax On Return is the total tax after credits from the 
U.S. Corporation Form 1120.  Agreed to at Exam is the payments posted to the taxpayer’s account, field X300R, during the examination process with 
respect to that return-year’s examination.  Agreed to at Appeals is the sum of payments posted to the taxpayer’s account during the appeal (A300R) or 
counsel (C300R) processes with respect to that return-year’s examination. Final Tax equals Tax On Return plus Agreed to at Exam plus Agreed to at 
Appeals. Agreed is the total amount of deficiency agreed to by the taxpayer when the case is closed through appeals and counsel . We limit the amounts 
Agreed to the Deficiency. In the VCBLM dataset, deficiencies are coded at $1 if there is a change that did not increase tax. We restore these observations 
to zero deficiency.  Assets is the total year-end assets from Form 1120, Schedule L. Sales is the gross receipts from Form 1120, page 1, Line 1. 
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TABLE 2 – Audit Results by Asset Class 














 Obs. w/ 
Prop. Tax 
>0 




Agreed to at Exam/ 
Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 11,196 49% 0.0027 0.0015  9,280 59% 0.099 0.457 
$100M<A<$250M 4,198 48% 0.0028 0.0019  3,530 57% 0.117 0.293 
$250M<A<$500M 3,032 53% 0.0025 0.0017  2,629 61% 0.115 0.329 
$500M<A<$1B 3,067 56% 0.0023 0.0018  2,737 63% 0.109 0.345 
$1B<A<$2B 2,746 62% 0.0023 0.0020  2,479 69% 0.121 0.281 
$2B<A<$5B 2,519 66% 0.0021 0.0021  2,345 71% 0.134 0.314 
A>$5B 2,383 74% 0.0014 0.0024  2,266 78% 0.146 0.323 
TOTALS 29,141 55% 0.0017 0.0022  25,266 63% 0.136 0.320 
 
Panel B – Full Sample, Closed versus Open Returns 
 
 Closed Returns Open Returns 




Agreed to at Exam/ 
 Deficiency 





 Prop. Tax 
Agreed to at Exam/ 
 Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 8,898 0.073 0.611 0.059 0.050 382 0.465 0.104 
$100M<A<$250M 3,336 0.086 0.403 0.076 0.043 194 0.443 0.067 
$250M<A<$500M 2,423 0.086 0.435 0.082 0.046 206 0.336 0.124 
$500M<A<$1B 2,476 0.083 0.479 0.096 0.050 261 0.272 0.084 
$1B<A<$2B 2,134 0.080 0.441 0.106 0.046 345 0.290 0.097 
$2B<A<$5B 1,839 0.091 0.471 0.134 0.057 506 0.251 0.159 
A>$5B 1,446 0.104 0.510 0.115 0.068 820 0.188 0.221 




TABLE 2 – Audit Results by Asset Class (continued) 
 
Panel C –Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC) only, All Returns 
 













Agreed to at Exam/ 
Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 85 51% 0.0054 0.0026  74 58% 0.147 0.227 
$100M<A<$250M 476 58% 0.0105 0.0057  415 66% 0.340 0.135 
$250M<A<$500M 1,123 63% 0.0044 0.0029  1,020 70% 0.192 0.246 
$500M<A<$1B 1,648 63% 0.0029 0.0023  1,524 68% 0.134 0.318 
$1B<A<$2B 1,861 67% 0.0028 0.0023  1,728 72% 0.137 0.258 
$2B<A<$5B 2,084 68% 0.0023 0.0023  1,965 73% 0.140 0.316 
A>$5B 2,230 75% 0.0015 0.0024  2,136 78% 0.148 0.314 
TOTALS 9,507 67% 0.0017 0.0024  8,862 72% 0.147 0.306 
 
Panel D  - Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC) only, Closed versus Open Returns 
 
 Closed Returns Open Returns 
Asset Class Obs Deficiency/ Agreed to at Exam/ Agreed to at Appeals/ Agreed/ Obs Deficiency/ Agreed to at Exam/ 
  Prop. Tax Deficiency Deficiency Final Tax  Prop. Tax Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 70 0.084 0.433 0.142 0.050 4 0.770 0.003 
$100M<A<$250M 388 0.266 0.170 0.118 0.095 27 0.669 0.074 
$250M<A<$500M 950 0.149 0.327 0.098 0.069 70 0.443 0.086 
$500M<A<$1B 1,390 0.107 0.425 0.110 0.060 134 0.334 0.075 
$1B<A<$2B 1,500 0.095 0.387 0.117 0.050 228 0.303 0.102 
$2B<A<$5B 1,549 0.098 0.469 0.130 0.061 416 0.256 0.156 
A>$5B 1,359 0.105 0.491 0.119 0.067 777 0.189 0.221 
TOTALS 7,206 0.104 0.459 0.120 0.063 1,656 0.207 0.198 
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TABLE 2 – Audit Results by Asset Class (continued) 
 

















Agreed to at Exam/ 
Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 11,111 49% 0.0026 0.0015  9,206 59% 0.098 0.464 
$100M<A<$250M 3,722 47% 0.0016 0.0011  3,115 56% 0.071 0.447 
$250M<A<$500M 1,909 46% 0.0013 0.0009  1,609 55% 0.062 0.510 
$500M<A<$1B 1,419 49% 0.0015 0.0013  1,213 57% 0.074 0.410 
$1B<A<$2B 885 52% 0.0011 0.0012  751 61% 0.073 0.404 
$2B<A<$5B 435 56% 0.0012 0.0013  380 64% 0.092 0.297 
A>$5B 153 61% 0.0009 0.0017  130 72% 0.100 0.645 
TOTALS 19,634 49% 0.0013 0.0013  16,404 58% 0.081 0.453 
 
Panel F  - NON-Coordinated Industry Cases (non-CIC) only, Closed versus Open Returns 
 
 Closed Returns Open Returns 
Asset Class Obs Deficiency/ Agreed to at Exam/ Agreed to at Appeals/ Agreed/ Obs Deficiency/ Agreed to at Exam/ 
  Prop. Tax Deficiency Deficiency Final Tax  Prop. Tax Deficiency 
A(assets)<$100M 8,828 0.073 0.614 0.057 0.050 378 0.457 0.108 
$100M<A<$250M 2,948 0.054 0.606 0.040 0.036 167 0.314 0.058 
$250M<A<$500M 1,473 0.044 0.678 0.045 0.032 136 0.224 0.204 
$500M<A<$1B 1,086 0.051 0.634 0.056 0.036 127 0.205 0.099 
$1B<A<$2B 634 0.040 0.789 0.039 0.034 117 0.241 0.072 
$2B<A<$5B 290 0.046 0.496 0.185 0.032 90 0.220 0.181 
A>$5B 87 0.089 0.891 0.041 0.083 43 0.130 0.217 
TOTALS 15,346 0.055 0.688 0.062 0.042 1,058 0.213 0.138 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
Asset classes are based on total ending assets from the Form 1120, Schedule L. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 -Audit Results for Full Sample by Firm Characteristic 
 

















Agreed to at Exam/ 
Deficiency 
Private 17,041 52% 0.0020 0.0025  14,410 62% 0.171 0.265 
Public 12,100 58% 0.0015 0.0021  10,856 65% 0.125 0.345 
         
Domestic 23,892 56% 0.0016 0.0021  21,054 64% 0.125 0.343 
Foreign-Controlled 5,249 47% 0.0023 0.0027  4,212 59% 0.254 0.202 
         
Domestic 16,676 52% 0.0013 0.0018  13,919 62% 0.135 0.286 
Multinational 12,456 58% 0.0018 0.0025  11,347 64% 0.137 0.333 
         
Non-CIC 19,634 49% 0.0013 0.0013  16,404 58% 0.081 0.453 
CIC 9,507 67% 0.0017 0.0024  8.862 72% 0.147 0.306 
         
Agriculture 229 45% 0.0010 0.0013  172 59% 0.096 0.413 
Mining & Utilities 2,975 59% 0.0010 0.0023  2,694 65% 0.090 0.285 
Manufacturing 12,765 56% 0.0020 0.0026  11,289 63% 0.162 0.308 
Trade & Transport. 7,192 55% 0.0016 0.0014  6,182 64% 0.133 0.319 
Insurance & Other 4,250 50% 0.0012 0.0024  3,530 60% 0.087 0.421 
Education & Health 676 45% 0.0031 0.0048  527 58% 0.221 0.275 
Arts & Food Serv. 837 52% 0.0016 0.0020  700 62% 0.114 0.446 
Other Services 216 43% 0.0012 0.0015  171 54% 0.068 0.442 
          
TOTALS 29,141 55% 0.0017 0.0022  25,266 63% 0.136 0.320 
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TABLE 3 -Audit Results for Full Sample by Firm Characteristic (continued) 
 
Panel B - Closed versus Open Returns 
 




Agreed to at Exam/ 
Deficiency 




Final Tax Obs. 
Deficiency/ 
Prop. Tax 
Agreed to at  
Exam/Deficiency 
Private 13,332 0.100 0.470 0.098 0.060 1,078 0.335 0.122 
Public 9,220 0.092 0.495 0.119 0.058 1,636 0.175 0.228 
        
Domestic 18,739 0.091 0.487 0.115 0.057 2,315 0.183 0.222 
Foreign-Controlled 3,813 0.129 0.493 0.095 0.080 399 0.438 0.077 
        
Domestic 12,798 0.104 0.394 0.106 0.055 1,121 0.202 0.168 
Multinational 9,754 0.089 0.535 0.116 0.060 1,593 0.208 0.201 
        
Non-CIC 15,346 0.055 0.688 0.062 0.042 1,058 0.213 0.138 
CIC 7,206 0.104 0.459 0.120 0.063 1,656 0.207 0.198 
        
Agriculture 155 0.066 0.499 0.156 0.044 17 0.413 0.267 
Mining & Utilities 2,340 0.082 0.349 0.111 0.039 354 0.107 0.188 
Manufacturing 10,028 0.104 0.520 0.123 0.069 1,261 0.257 0.171 
Trade & Transport. 5,698 0.091 0.414 0.095 0.048 484 0.234 0.231 
Insurance & Other 3,092 0.074 0.592 0.086 0.051 438 0.101 0.284 
Education & Health 465 0.105 0.528 0.049 0.063 62 0.331 0.199 
Arts & Food Serv. 622 0.092 0.529 0.169 0.066 78 0.223 0.281 
Other Services 151 0.047 0.595 0.085 0.032 20 0.224 0.201 
        
TOTALS 22,551 0.094 0.487 0.113 0.059 2,714 0.207 0.193 
Notes to Table 3.  
Public includes those taxpayers whose Employer Identification Number (EIN) on the Form 1120 matches the firm-year EIN on S&P Compustat, and for which total financial statement 
assets (Data #6) is nonmissing. If no EIN match is found for the firm on Compustat, the firm is classified as Private. Firms are classified as a Foreign Controlled Corporation (FCC) if the 
answer to Question 7 on Form 1120 Schedule K is yes (the question asks whether during any time of the year one foreign person owned at least 25% of the stock of the company).  If the 
answer to Question 7 is no, the firm is classified as Domestic. Firms are classified as being Multinational if they claim a foreign tax credit on Form 1120 or file a Form 5471, indicating 
they owned a foreign subsidiary. If the firm does not claim a FTC or file a Form 5471, the firm is classified as Domestic. The CIC grouping of firms includes those firms that are part of 
the IRS’s Coordinated Industry Cases (large case audits). All other firms are labeled non-CIC firms. Industry classifications are taken from the North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) codes which are recorded in the IRS data for each return-year.
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TABLE 4 – Descriptive Statistics 
 





Deficiency/Assets 29,141 0.0020 0.0055 0.0000 0.0001 0.0013
Deficiency/Sales 29,141 0.0022 0.0068 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012
Log(Assets) 29,141 5.499 1.996 3.894 5.328 6.995
Log(Sales) 29,141 5.529 1.946 4.104 5.480 6.943
Assets ($Millions) 29,141 1,623.500 4,244.680 49.116 206.001 1,091.340
Sales ($Millions) 29,141 1,305.120 2,989.250 60.561 239.888 1,035.440
Coordinated Industry Cases  29,141 0.326 0.469 0 0 1
Public 29,141 0.415 0.493 0 0 1
FCC 29,141 0.180 0.384 0 0 0
Multinational 29,141 0.428 0.495 0 0 1
U.S. Current ETR 11,207 0.289 0.206 0.152 0.287 0.369
Advertising/Assets 11,515 0.013 0.033 0 0 0.006
R&D Expense/Assets 11,515 0.025 0.047 0 0 0.028
Market-to-Book Ratio 11,515 2.508 2.272 1.292 1.918 3.017
Bonus Percentage 3,875 0.228 0.151 0.112 0.226 0.328
Exercisable Option Sensitivity 3,842 0.110 0.182 0.011 0.044 0.125
Vested Holdings Sensitivity 3,869 0.648 1.388 0.076 0.204 0.547
Total Equity Sensitivity 3,875 0.768 1.466 0.116 0.291 0.728













Notes to Table 4: 
All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% and ETRs are limited to be between 0% and 75%. Coordinated Industry Cases, Public, FCC, and Multinational are indicator variables 
set equal to one if the firm is identified as part of these groups (defined in Table 3), and set equal to zero otherwise.  U.S. Current ETR is the firm’s effective tax rate calculated as 
the U.S. portion of current tax expense divided by US pre-tax book income (Compustat data item 63/data item 272). Advertising is the firm’s advertising expense from their 
financial statements (Compustat data item 45). R&D Expense is the firm’s research and development expense from their financial statements (Compustat data item 46).  Market-to-
Book is the firm’s market value of equity divided by the book value of equity ((data item 99 X data item 25)/data item 60). Bonus percentage is the proportion of compensaton that 
is bonus. it is calculated as the sum over the five most highly paid executives of the annual bonus in the year prior to the year for which the tax deficiency is assessed scaled by the 
sum of the bonus, salary, and the Black-Scholes value of the stock option grants for the five most highly paid executives in the year prior to the year for which the tax deficiency is 
assessed.  Exercisable Option Sensitivity is the sensitivity of the holdings of exercisable (vested) executive stock options to a 1% change in stock price. This is the sum for the five 
most highly paid executives of the firm and holdings are measured in the year prior to the year for which the deficiency is assessed. Vested Holdings Sensitivity is the sensitivity of 
the holdings of exercisable executive stock options and unrestricted stock to a 1% change in stock price. This is the sum for the five most highly paid executives of the firm and 
holdings are measured in the year prior to the year for which the deficiency is assessed. Total Equity Sensitivity is the sensitivity of the holdings of all stock options, all unrestricted 
stock, and all restricted stock to a 1% change in stock price.  This is the sum over the five most highly paid executives of the firm and holdings are measured in the year prior to the 
year for which the deficiency is assessed. Governance Index is a measure of governance developed by Gompers et al (2003). It is an index of shareholder rights that ranges from 0-
24, a low value indicates high quality governance. The index is set to zero in regression when missing. Governance Index Missing is an  indicator set equal to one if Governance 




TABLE 5 – Baseline Tobit Regressions 
 
 
 Full Sample CIC only Full Sample CIC only 
Dependent variable: Deficiency / Sales Deficiency / Assets 
Intercept -0.0053 -0.0041 -0.0078 -0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0048 
 -4.74 -3.66 -3.52 -4.46 -3.49 -2.82 
Log (Size) -0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.00004 0.00019 0.0001 
 -0.67 5.05 2.52 0.99 5.08 1.70 
CIC 0.0032 dropped n/a 0.0020 dropped n/a 
 11.24   8.78   
Public -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0004 
 -6.98 -6.57 -0.87 -10.39 -9.72 -2.17 
FCC -0.0009 
-
0.00095 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0005 
 -4.89 -5.12 -0.65 -8.49 -8.36 -1.76 
Multinational 0.0004 0.0005 0.0016 0.0002 0.0003 0.0013 
 2.75 3.08 6.81 1.97 2.43 7.25 
Return_yr dummies  Untabulated 
1-digit NAICS codes Untabulated 
       
Observations 29,141 29,141 9,507 29,141 29,141 9,507 
L.R. Chi-squared 810.56 684.63 163.12 660.47 583.67 170.45 
 
 
Notes to Table 5: Variables are as defined in Tables 2-4.
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TABLE 6 – Tobit Regression with Additional Variables 
Dependent Variable: Deficiency/Sales 
 













Intercept -0.0073 -0.0102 -0.0080 -0.0095 -0.0095 
 -3.22 -4.35 -3.44 -4.10 -4.08 
Log (Assets) 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
 1.35 2.29 1.61 2.23 2.06 
CIC 0.0026 0.0021 0.0022 0.0021 0.0021 
 7.45 6.07 6.31 6.19 6.08 
FCC -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0034 
 -2.78 -3.12 -3.03 -3.12 -3.11 
Multinational 0.0010 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
 2.94 1.53 1.70 1.77 1.71 
R&D Expense/Assets  0.0173 0.0150 0.0164 0.0161 
  5.63 4.88 5.39 5.29 
Advertising/Assets  -0.0073 -0.0078 -0.0077 -0.0080 
  -1.89 -2.05 -2.03 -2.09 
Market-to-Book  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
  6.81 6.14 6.39 6.19 
Compensation Variable  0.0024 0.0018 0.0002 0.0002 




-0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0010 
  -2.02 -2.05 -1.78 -1.67 
Governance index(0 if 
missing) 
 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
  -1.37 -1.28 -1.09 -0.95. 
Return_yr dummies  Untabulated 
1-digit NAICS codes  Untabulated 
      
Observations 3,875 3,860 3,830 3,857 3,860 
L.R. Chi-squared 187.85 293.78 292.19 288.14 292.56 
Notes to Table 6: Variables are as defined in Tables 2-4.
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TABLE 7 -Correlation Matrix of Deficiency-Based Measures and ETRs 
 






U.S. Current ETR -0.095 0.027 0.055
p-value 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000
observations 10,545 11,778 11,778
 
 
Panel B – Observations 








U.S. Current ETR -0.055 -0.005 0.022
p-value 0.00 0.6412 0.0268




Notes to Table 7: Variables are defined as in Tables 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 8 – ETR Regressions 
 










Dependent variable (ETR)  



















Return_yr dummies  Untabulated 
1-digit NAICS codes Untabulated 
Observations 11,208 9,346
L.R. Chi-squared  461.01 408.29
Notes to Table 8: Variables are defined as in Tables 3 and 4. 
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APPENDIX A - Sample Selection Details 
 
  Observations
VCBLM audit data  114,257
SOI tax return data  
     LMSB 1994-2002  526,610
     CIC 1981-1993  18,411
Merge VCBLM, SOI  45,121
  
   
Drop observations where:  Drop Subtotal
  Year <1983, >1998  6,207 38,914
   Financial Services Industry  8,720 30,194
    Status code < 80   




    Industry code missing  4 29,975
   Tax deficiency < 0  312 29,663
   Total ending assets =0  248 29,415
   Total sales =0  274 29,141
  
 Final Sample    29,141
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
